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The argument of the Austrian school of economists that markets are indispensable in 
the face of social and economic complexity is of defining importance for the modern 
day case for markets. The dominant paradigm in green political economy accepts this 
view, whilst proposing that markets be combined with a thick layer of democratic, 
non-market institutions to ensure environmental sustainability.  
 
Closer attention to the relationship between the Austrian and green arguments reveals 
important implications for both. The Austrian thesis raises significant challenges for 
the ‘halfway house’ combination of market and non-market that greens propose. Also, 
potential responses to the Austrians emerge from green thought. New light is shed 
upon the problem of complexity and the how it might be addressed by non-market 
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The complexity of modern society has, in much of contemporary political theory, 
been viewed as posing a challenge to democracy. Democracy requires that a 
multiplicity of values be accommodated in a way that ensures legitimacy. Political 
and economic institutions therefore need to enable individuals to act autonomously on 
the basis of their value priorities. This is the essence of the modern argument for the 
free market that originates from the Austrian school of economists, in particular 
Friedrich A Hayek and his mentor Ludwig von Mises. This argument has gained 
widespread acceptance, even though markets entail a set of widely recognised 
problems, including inequality, external effects and instability, which prompt the 
question of what the proper role of markets should be.  
 
Green political economy is concerned with a broad range of questions including these 
problems of the market, as well as other issues such as human rights and social 
solidarity. Here, the focus shall be on the green response to the problem of 
externalities, in particular ecological degradation. Although there is a broad spectrum 
of views within the green tradition about the proper role of markets, it is to be argued 
here that a ‘green paradigm’ can be defined that captures the approach of many, 
perhaps even most, green theorists to the externalities problem. In the green paradigm, 
markets are given a restricted role, located within the context of a thick layer of 
democratic, non-market institutions. As is to be explored here, this is markedly 
different to the pro-free market position of the Austrians as a response to the 
challenge of complexity.  
 
The Austrian pro-market thesis was developed during what is now known as the 
‘socialist calculation debate’ and was initially targeted at those socialists who 
advocated a planned, entirely non-market economy.i It is perhaps for this reason that it 
receives less attention from green theorists than might be expected. Yet some 
important parts of the Austrians’ thesis are applicable to the green paradigm. Hayek 
offered a critique of such a mixed economy, that he disparagingly referred to as a 
‘halfway house’ (Hayek 1949: 79). It is the purpose of this paper to assess the 
challenge posed to green political economy by the Austrians’ work.  
 
Although authors within the green paradigm rarely refer directly to the Austrians’ 
arguments, green thought does open up some important avenues for responding to the 
Austrian challenge. The green paradigm causes us to reassess the socialist calculation 
debate and offers insight into the potential of non-market institutions that are 
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overlooked by the Austrians. Hence there is scope for cross-fertilisation between 
green thought and the socialist calculation debate – two areas that have remained 
somewhat separate. This promises benefits for both. 
 
Here, the thesis of the Austrians is firstly outlined, with particular attention to the role 
of complexity in their case for markets. The green paradigm is then defined and its 
response to this challenge is assessed. The greens’ normative objectives of 
sustainability and participatory democracy are shown to re-shape problems of 
economic calculation and the role of non-market institutions. The implications of this 




2 The pro-market argument 
 
The core of the Austrian thesis is that markets are a decentralised means of 
coordinating a multiplicity of economic actors who hold a variety of objectives. 
Attempts to replace the market with planning will inevitably fail due to the complex 
nature of modern economies. The nature of complexity is brought to the fore in the 
Austrians’ discussion of economic calculation as an essential function that can only be 
performed by the market system. This discussion is to be reviewed here and shown to 
reveal two preconditions of democracy that form the basis of the Austrian case for 
markets. 
 
2.1 Defining complexity 
 
Although there is no explicit definition of complexity in Mises and Hayek, six aspects 
of the concept can be drawn from their discussion of the complex nature of decisions 
that would face planners in the absence of markets.ii These are as follows: 
 
i. The number of decisions that need to be made. 
ii. The number of variables needing to be considered in assessing the likely 
impact of decisions. 
iii. The extent of interdependency of these variables. 
iv. The instability of the environment. 
v. The variety of ends held by individuals in society. 
vi. The variation in the intensity of individuals’ preferences for different ends.  
 
Taken together, these different aspects of complexity can serve as criteria for 
assessing the extent of complexity involved in societal decision-making. 
 
2.2 Three forms of complexity 
 
The Austrians’ offer important insights into how, in terms of the six criteria identified 
above, the calculative functions performed by the market must address a high degree 
of complexity. This contribution needs to be understood in the context of the 
important distinction made by Mises between calculation in the productive and 
distributive spheres of the economy. Productive calculation involves choosing a 
‘target set’ of goods to produce and how to produce it. The challenge of distributing 
the goods once they have been produced is, as Mises argues, a separate problem 
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(Mises 1935: 90). According to the Austrians, both forms of calculation are only 
achievable by means of the market. Although the market can perform the productive 
and distributive forms of calculation simultaneously, they are logically distinct 
functions. 
 

























 Table 1. The Austrian treatment of complexity 
 
The focus of the Austrians is upon non-market calculation in the sphere of production 
that (unlike non-market distribution) is considered by Mises to be a defining feature of 
socialism. As shown in Table 1, three forms of complexity emerge in the productive 
sphere: technical, economic and value. Technical complexity is faced when 
calculating the factor requirements for producing given quantities of goods with given 
productive technologies (Mises 1935: 129; Hayek 1976: 117). These requirements are 
defined as ratios between physical quantities of different factors and can be calculated 
without knowledge of market exchange values. Economic complexity characterises 
the producers’ choices between alternative methods of production. Value complexity 
refers to the wide variety of ends that motivate consumers that in turn motivate 
producers in their choice of what to produce. The productive choice, for example, of 
whether to make chairs out of plastic or wood must in part depend upon the relative 
preferences of consumers for these materials and their alternative uses, as well as their 
relative availability. Value complexity is of course a challenge that also arises in the 
distributive sphere of the economy. 
 
Both economic and value complexity emerge from the Austrians’ work as a challenge 
to democracy. In relation to each, the market fulfils a dual objective that is a 
precondition of democracy. Failure to meet these objectives leads to what Hayek 
famously describes as the ‘road to serfdom’. Firstly, in relation to economic 
complexity, we can identify the ‘efficiency pre-condition’ of democracy. This means 
achievement of a balance between the utilisation of local knowledge through 
decentralisation whilst facilitating economy-wide coordination. The market achieves 
this dual objective, by allowing producers to make decisions on the basis of “their 
immediate surroundings” (Hayek 1949: 84) whilst, in the process, establishing prices 
that convey information to economic actors, enabling them to fit their “decisions into 
the whole pattern of changes of the larger economic system” (ibid: 84). It is difficult 
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to compare different economic alternatives while they are expressed in terms of 
different, incommensurable values. Monetary prices are a commensurable unit of 
measurement in terms of which alternatives can be compared. Whilst they may not 
fully capture all aspects of value, prices are indispensable as “aids to the mind” (Mises 
1935: 102). Markets also generate an incentive for producers to discover new, more 
efficient and effective ways of satisfying demand.  
 
The Austrians maintain that, in a system of planning, each of these two parts of the 
dual objective can only be achieved at the expense of the other. Coordination can be 
achieved only through centralisation that can result in a lack of accountability and 
neglect of the extensive local knowledge of producers and consumers. Conversely, 
attempts to decentralise result in a loss of society-wide coordination. In the absence of 
the market, innovation would be stifled.  
 
The ‘ethical pre-condition’ of democracy is to ensure that value complexity is 
addressed by granting priority to individual autonomy. For the Austrians, this means 
securing the right of individual consumers to engage in market transactions free from 
all but the most necessary and consistently applied forms of state intervention. This 
principle is often referred to as ‘consumer sovereignty’ and it entails the freedom of 
individuals to choose those goods that accord with the satisfaction of their subjective 
preferences. For the Austrians, this ethical justification for markets as an essential 
feature of the liberal order stands independent of the individual ends that might shape 
these preferences.  
 
 
3 The green paradigm  
 
By the 1980s, the Austrian efficiency arguments for markets were generally viewed as 
having triumphed in the socialist calculation debate. Many on the left came to accept 
that a role for markets must necessarily be preserved in any alternative to the free 
market. This conclusion has also been widely supported within the green tradition. It 
is possible to identify a significant, if not dominant, school of thought amongst 
greens, which accepts the need for markets, whilst arguing that they need to be 
situated within the context of a thick layer of non-market institutions for securing a 
range of social objectives, including environmental sustainability. This envisaged role 
for non-market institutions is more substantial than in the present-day economic 
systems in countries such as the U.K. 
 
This view is referred to here as the ‘green paradigm.’ It is recognised that not all 
political theorists and economists whose work might be described as ‘green’ are 
included within this paradigm. There is a great deal of variety amongst the models of 
political economy proposed by ‘green’ theorists and the ambiguity of this very label is 
widely recognised. One concept that does seem to be definitive of distinctively 
‘green’ thought is a concern for achieving environmental sustainability, though the 
meaning of this concept itself is strongly contested. Various definitions of 
sustainability are defended, ranging from ‘strong’ to ‘weak’ sustainability. Writers 
within the green paradigm subscribe to strong sustainability, according to which the 
level of natural capital (measured either in physical or value terms)is kept constant. 
Weaker versions of the concept grant that “depletion of natural resources and 
degradation of ecosystem functions is acceptable provided that sufficient human-made 
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capital is accumulated to substitute for these resources and functions” (Krishnan et al 
1995: 98). 
 
As well as offering differing interpretations of the normative objective of 
sustainability, green theorists also vary in terms of their economic proposals for 
achieving the objective, ranging from free market environmentalism to eco-socialist 
models where the market is either removed or has a highly limited role. In between 
these two extremes, different systems seek to combine markets with a variety of 
different forms of intervention in the market. It follows that there is no single 
definitive ‘green model’ of political economy. The purpose here is to define a broad 
paradigm to capture the common ground held by a significant number, though 
certainly not all, green theorists. Writers who do fall within the green paradigm 
include Jonathan Porritt, Herman Daly, Michael Jacobs and John Barry. The paradigm 
is not intended to capture all features of the work of such writers. For example, some 
have proposed workplace democracy or worker ownership schemes that are not to be 
treated here as definitive features of the paradigm. 
 
The green paradigm is to be defined in terms of three key features. The first is 
adoption of a strong conception of sustainability. The next two features are political 
economic features, which concern, respectively, the state-market and state-citizenry 
relationships. The former is a view of the market as a necessary means of achieving 
an economic allocation of resources whilst operating within limits that are established 
by non-market institutions to ensure (strong) environmental sustainability. Within the 
green tradition, two distinct approaches are often identified concerning the role of 
markets in achieving sustainability, usually referred to as ‘environmental economics’ 
and ‘ecological economics’. Some of the differences between the two schools are 
further explored below. Here, we need to note that environmental economics is 
typically twinned with a weak conception of sustainability and hence differs from 
ecological economics in terms of the form this intervention should take. 
Environmental economics aims to achieve sustainability by the indirect means of 
financial instruments such as taxes and subsidies. Ecological economics, by contrast, 
places economics within the systemic context of ecology. It therefore questions the 
possibility of ensuring sustainability solely by means of internalising environmental 
costs into the market mechanism. Ecological economics emphasises that the planet is 
a thermodynamically closed, finite system and hence environmental limits must be 
fixed prior to the occurrence of market exchange. Of course, as Jacobs suggests, this 
‘ecological’ approach can be combined with the policy instruments of environmental 
economics (Jacobs 1991: 151-2). Authors in the green paradigm tend to take this 
pragmatic approach to the question of the suitability of different forms of intervention 
in the market. They are thus best distinguished from the environmental economics 
school in terms of their objective of strong sustainability, although this does tend to 
lead them towards an ecological economics framework.  
 
An early and very influential ecological economist is Herman Daly. He proposes a 
general economic framework that seeks  
 
“to combine micro freedom and variability with macro stability and control. This 
means, in practice, relying on market allocation of an aggregate resource throughput 
whose total is not set by the market, but rather fixed collectively on the basis of 
ecological criteria of sustainability and ethical criteria of stewardship” (Daly 1987: 7).  
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Such criteria of sustainability constitute constraints that both the market and the state 
must operate within.  
 
The third key feature of the green paradigm, also evident in the above quotation from 
Daly, is that there is a need for the sustainability limits to be established collectively 
through a democratic procedure in which the citizenry become engaged. As writers 
within the green paradigm make clear (Porritt 1984: 134; Daly & Cobb 1989: 172; 
Barry 1999: 119-121), participatory democracy is held to be an important means of 
establishing and sustaining a green economy. The bureaucratic and centralised 
approach of environmental economics to policy formation has been criticised for its 
neglect of public participation.iii The financial instruments that they propose require a 
monetary cost to firstly be assigned to the external environmental effects that they aim 
to internalise. Yet the methodology that environmental economists adopt to establish 
such a cost is disputed and some argue that it is fundamentally flawed. This raises the 
question of how such calculation can be conducted in a manner compatible with 
democracy. Unlike the green paradigm, environmental economists do not consider the 
potential role of democratic, non-market institutions in such decisions.  
 
 
4 Economic complexity and the Austrian case against intervention 
 
The inclusion of the market within a halfway house model might be considered by 
socialists and greens to make it less vulnerable to Hayek’s ‘road to serfdom’ 
argument. After all, such a model allows for free markets in the distributive sphere of 
the economy and for markets to operate, within limits, in the productive sphere. 
However, from the Austrian perspective, the halfway house model still faces a 
profound problem of complexity. The Austrians provide a critique of socialist mixed 
models that, like the more recent green paradigm, place limits upon the market in 
order to achieve certain normative objectives that cannot be achieved by the market 
alone. These socialist models emphasise equality of income and social ownership 
rather than environmental sustainability, although the Austrian critique can be 
extended to other versions of the halfway house such as that of the green paradigm. 
 
Whereas in non-market socialism, the problem of complexity arises from the absence 
of markets, for the ‘halfway house’ it emerges from the challenge of effective market 
intervention. Within the green paradigm this means setting taxes or quotas upon the 
use of scarce natural resources, or granting subsidies to promote more sustainable 
productive practices (see, for example, Porritt 1984: 133). Such policies are 
emphasised by the Austrians to inevitably require a significant degree of centralised 
state decision-making (Hayek 1949: 133-4). Setting such taxes requires detailed 
knowledge of supply and demand in the economy while its negative, a subsidy, 
requires intervention in capital markets. In the face of economic complexity, Mises’ 
view is that, as Ioannides puts it: 
 
“(An) intervention in the free workings of the market system can never ‘calculate’ the 
full consequences of its application. Even if the government is in a position to assess 
the immediate consequences of such action it can certainly not calculate with certainty 
its repercussions on the whole of the market system” (Ioannides 2000: 63).  
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The Austrian argument is echoed by contemporary political economists in their 
analysis of attempts to establish a mixed economy in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union under perestroika. Kornai argues that such attempts to combine market and 
plan result in competition becoming compromised by state subsidies that necessarily 
feature in the ‘halfway house.’ Subsidised firms face only a ‘soft budget constraint’ 
because they know that the state would bail them out should they face insolvency 
(Kornai 1993: 140-5). A related point is that protection of existing firms creates a 
barrier to entry for new firms. This is what Hayek meant when he said that 
intervention could stifle the very competition that spurs entrepreneurial 
responsiveness to the ever-changing conditions of demand and supply. 
 
Peter Boettke, in his critique of the interventionist nature of the state in the Soviet 
Union under perestroika points to the core problem of economic change that Soviet 
planners continued to face, even as their economy started to incorporate a greater role 
for the market. “(Information) gathered yesterday may be irrelevant for decisions 
today because of changing conditions” (Boettke 1993: 92), he writes, emphasising 
that intervention in the market faces an inevitable problem of anticipating the likely 
outcome of an economic decision. There is a danger of “(Ignorant) or haphazard 
intervention” that “will simply lead to further destabilization and exacerbate the 
problem it sought originally to correct” (ibid). For Boettke and Kornai these problems 
mean that there are inherent difficulties in establishing a stable halfway house. 
Kornai’s bleak conclusion is that there is “no Third Way available between capitalism 
and socialism” (Gamble 1996: 69).iv 
 
In the field of environmental policy, the arguments of free market environmentalism  
exhibit a similarly Austrian influence (e.g. Anderson and Leal 1991). Given that it is 
impossible to assimilate knowledge of “all of the possible variations in an ecosystem” 
(ibid: 170) they view the task of achieving effective non-market intervention to be 
hugely problematic. For free marketeers, the cause of a range of environmental 
problems is not the market itself but the absence of clearly defined property rights 
over environmental resources.v Where public institutions manage common resources, 
it is argued that officials do not have the same incentive as private owners to manage 
the resource effectively. Furthermore, private ownership rights should be 
accompanied by a responsibility to pay for the costs of environmental damage (ibid: 
25).  
   
This contemporary version of the Austrian argument highlights the complex nature of 
economic decisions facing policy makers in a green economy. Yet the purpose here is 
not to provide a detailed examination of this case against intervention in the market. 
Instead, the aim is to highlight how the green paradigm can serve as the basis for a 
response to the Austrian argument by casting the complexity problem in a new light.  
 
 
5 Greens and the scale of environmental externalities 
 
The green paradigm makes a strong case for the necessity of intervention in the 
market by providing a thorough theoretical and empirical analysis of modern 
environmental problems. Although this work is not usually targeted at the Austrians in 
particular, it constitutes an important counter-weight to the Austrian approach.  
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It should firstly be noted, however, that there is some important common ground 
shared by the Austrian school and ecological economists. Firstly, Austrians, like 
ecological economists recognise the incommensurability of the heterogeneous array of 
values in society (including environmental values) (Greenwood 2006). Secondly, for 
both, it is nevertheless possible, at least in principle, for market prices to incorporate 
this array of values to an extent that is satisfactory. Where the two schools differ is in 
the scale of market regulation that they consider to be required to achieve this. The 
green paradigm is characterised by a focus upon this question of the scale of 
environmental problems and the degree of regulation that they require. 
 
Green theory emphasises two features of environmental problems that give cause for 
market intervention. Firstly, environmental protection is often a public good, meaning 
that its benefits are available to everybody, regardless of whether or not they 
contributed to its cost. This creates an incentive for each individual to ‘free ride’ upon 
the choice of others to meet the cost of environmental protection, whilst declining to 
do so themselves. A second common feature of environmental problems is that they 
are often externalities, meaning that market exchange cannot, in itself, ensure that 
their costs or benefits are reflected in exchange values. A well known example of a 
negative externality is pollution. The market in itself cannot ensure that the cost of 
this activity is borne by the individual or firm responsible for it. Solutions to such 
negative externalities must, by definition, come from outside of the market. Note that 
external effects are not necessarily public. The cost of pollution, for example, might 
fall upon the owner of private land for example. It follows that the problems of public 
goods provision and externalities can be logically distinguished.  
 
The work of Hayek is indicative of the general tendency in the Austrian school to 
underestimate the significance of these issues that are of concern for both ecological 
and environmental economics. Hayek does acknowledge the need for the state to 
provide some public goods (Hayek 1960: 222-4) and also refers to the problem of 
externalities (or “neighbourhood effects”) (ibid: 369). Yet his brief treatment leaves 
some key questions unanswered. As De Jasay puts it, he mentions public goods theory 
only “cursorily” (De Jasay 1996: 111-2) and the role of the state is left “open ended” 
and “indeterminate” (ibid: 113). Similarly, Hayek makes only brief reference to the 
problem of negative environmental externalities (Hayek 1944: 29; 1960: 369) where 
he acknowledges that alternative forms of property ownership might be appropriate 
for certain natural resources. Had he understood the potential scale of contemporary 
problems such as climate change and biodiversity loss, Hayek might have recognised 
that a large degree of regulation is required to address them. Yet this can of course 
only be a matter of speculation.  
 
More recent free marketeers such as Anderson and Leal, whose work exhibits a strong 
Hayekian influence, also fail to give adequate acknowledgement of the scale of 
current ecological problems. Their work provides detailed treatment of a number of 
topics such as over fishing and waste disposal but does not acknowledge the overall 
extent of such problems on a national and international scale. Anderson and Leal 
emphasise the contested meaning of sustainability and suggest that it should 
ultimately take second place to the principle of consumer sovereignty (Anderson and 
Leal 1991: 168-72). 
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For greens, this question of the overall scale of ecological degradation is of crucial 
importance for assessing the potential benefits of intervention in the market. These 
benefits might, after all, outweigh the negative consequences of attempts to regulate 
the market that are highlighted by the Austrians. A case in point to highlight such a 
green argument might be the London congestion charge. A £5 fixed chargevi for 
driving in central London was criticised as being a blunt instrument before it was 
introduced in 2003. Undesirable effects were anticipated, such as penalising some 
relatively low paid workers who need their cars to perform important work in central 
London and an increased congestion in the areas immediately outside of the zone. 
However, a very strong case can be made that the benefits in terms of reduced car use 
in London resulting from the charge have outweighed these disadvantages.  
 
This kind of argument concerning the potential to improve net economic outcomes 
through market intervention suggests that the halfway house might be a possible route 
to establishing the two democratic preconditions of autonomy and efficiency. This 
might seem to lead us to the conclusion of Tomlinson in his discussion of market 
socialism that: “planning and markets can and have been mixed in a variety of ways, 
ways that can be sustained without leading down the road to serfdom” (Tomlinson 
1990: 122).  
 
 
6 Free market solutions? 
 
The free marketeers’ proposal for an extension of environmental property rights does 
not offer the kind of straightforward avoidance of the economic complexity problem 
as is supposed, for example, by Anderson and Leal. For it must still face complex 
issues concerning how property rights are to be defined and allocated for a vast range 
of ecological services. 
 
Pennington distinguishes the free market environmentalist approach to defining 
property rights from both the ecological and environmental economics schools. These 
latter approaches, he notes, involve a significant element of centralised decision-
making by the state (Pennington 2003: 57-9). The ecological school, typified by the 
work of Herman Daly, proposes that the state implements quantity rationing of 
ecological services, meaning that quantitative environmental limits are fixed prior to 
the commencement of market exchange. Daly proposes that permits to use ecological 
services within these fixed limits be then allocated by means of an auction. 
Environmental economics, by contrast, favours price rationing, with the state firstly 
setting taxes or subsidies on the use of ecological services where necessary. The 
quantity of ecological services used then adjusts to their price. 
 
In a Hayekian critique of these two approaches, Pennington emphasises that 
knowledge concerning different externalities and how property rights might best be 
specified to address them is dispersed across society (ibid: 57; 61). Property rights 
would, he infers, best be defined through a market process of negotiation and 
competition between different resource owners themselves in order to utilise this local 
knowledge. The role of the state in such a ‘free market’ system would be to specify 
general ‘rules of just conduct’ for negotiating parties (ibid: 61). This free market 
environmentalism highlights the dynamic nature of environmental problems and, 
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following Hayek, emphasises that property rights need to be adapt through a process 
of evolutionary change.  
 
Yet the legal character of property rights means that they must be sanctioned by the 
state. Each change in property rights, or decision to leave the law unchanged in 
response to new circumstances, requires state consent. Even in the free market system, 
the state must at least agree upon the procedures through which property rights are to 
be defined. Given that the market itself, by definition, cannot address externality 
problems, the state needs to be sure that the property rights system that is established 
will satisfactorily address them. This involves choosing between a number of possible 
property rights ‘regimes’, ranging from systems of individually-held private property 
to various forms of collective ownership (Bromley 1991: 21-39). Defining an 
appropriate regime requires non-market information and does not easily side-step the 
challenge of complexity that characterises many decisions concerning the allocation 
of environmental resources. 
 
A further aspect of the challenge of complexity that governments face in a market 
system is that of unequal purchasing power. As Dragun puts it, in a market system 
“property rights are a direct function of existing regimes of power in society" (Dragun 
1983: 673). Even where property rights might initially be allocated in a way that is 
agreed to be fair, new inequalities can soon develop. Here emerges the problem of 
monopoly that, as the Austrians acknowledge, is a potential problem in any kind of 
market system. Monopolies can create barriers to entry for newer, less established 
firms (Hayek 1979: 84) a problem that could arise in Daly’s permit auction as well as 
a free market model. In Daly’s system this might be preventable by some form of 
non-market intervention such as retaining some permit allowances for new entrants, 
though this might itself create inefficiencies by penalising more efficient, established 
firms. Here, once again, markets face problems of complexity from which there is no 
straightforward escape.  
 
 
7 Sustainability and complexity 
 
By ensuring that economic activity remains within sustainable limits, ecological 
economics rules out a vast array of unsustainable productive methods. Of course, 
trade-offs remain in the sustainable economy between alternative uses of economic 
resources and so the problem of productive calculation remains a complex one. In a 
sustainable economy, different kinds of complex decision, not previously considered, 
may come to the fore. Yet the sustainability principle does mean that the number of 
production possibilities is reduced. 
 
For ecological economists, the behaviour of economic actors is not the only source of 
complexity in modern society. Ecosystems themselves are complex and the ecological 
impact of future activities is characterised by uncertainty and associated risk. It is 
emphasised that an unacceptable degree of risk arises from many of the productive 
technologies that have been developed by the contemporary market economy, with 
examples ranging from nuclear power to genetically modified crops. This risk 
concerns possible future ecological impacts that are external to market calculation. On 
these grounds, the precautionary principle can be adopted, an approach that rules out 
the use of certain productive technologies altogether because of the risk that they 
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involve. This principle, which is generally favoured within the green paradigm, once 
again reduces the number of production possibilities that are considered legitimate by 
the green paradigm.  
 
Thus, rather than treating complexity as a category beyond the scope of analysis, 
green thought shows that there is potential for re-shaping calculation in the economic 
sphere and addressing complexity through decisions concerning the relationship 
between humanity and nature. The reduction of production possibilities in the green 
paradigm due to the sustainability and precautionary principles is in contrast to the 
free market approach which offers no such guaranteed limits to economic activity and 
considers demonstrably or potentially unsustainable alternatives to be legitimate and 
feasible. Any efficiency gains of the free market model need to be balanced against 
the benefit in the ecological model of ensuring that unsustainable options are avoided. 
 
 
8 Complexity and knowledge 
 
Throughout Hayek’s work there is a strong scepticism about the capacity of 
centralised, non-market institutions to acquire adequate economic knowledge for 
effective market intervention.  He emphasises that economic knowledge is dispersed 
across space and time. A decentralised system is therefore required that enables the 
individual producer to make autonomous decisions in response to changing 
circumstances. To some extent, the green paradigm shares Hayek’s doubts about 
centralised planning institutions (O’Neill 2004: 434). This partly explains why the 
green paradigm retains a role for the market and typically shows a strong sensitivity to 
the importance of local knowledge. This is evident, for example, in Barry’s 
conception of ‘collective ecological management’ which combines coordination of 
production through the market (Barry 1999: 118) with a significant role for non-
market institutions operating at different geographical scales. For certain kinds of 
environmental problem, such as local forest management for example, decentralised 
non-market institutions are recognised as most appropriate within the green paradigm. 
Yet the Green movement also identifies environmental problems requiring the kind of 
planning that can be “devised and carried out only by centralised political structures” 
(Dobson 1990: 184). The need for centralised institutions to address global 
environmental issues such as climate change is increasingly being recognised, even in 
today’s global economy, where the market has a much freer role than is proposed by 
the green model.  
 
Actually existing non-market institutions on both a national and sometimes 
multinational scale have, to some extent, developed certain knowledge gathering and 
environmental planning capabilities of the kind that is envisaged by the green 
paradigm, even if they do not go as far as the greens propose. As Jacobs explains, 
these institutions have a role in the policy making process. This includes setting 
“targets for the key environmental indicators” that “define the level at which 
environmental capacity is to be protected” (Jacobs 1991: 119).  
 
Sustainability limits have been established for a variety of different ecological 
services.vii A sustainability limit is a level of an environmental variable beyond which 
a given ecosystem function is substantially impaired or disabled. The impairment, and 
the limit which has been transgressed and led to the impairment, may be described in 
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scientific terms. But the decision as to whether to transgress the limit, or whether it is 
‘acceptable’, is unavoidably political. The establishment of sustainability limits in 
terms of ‘substantial impairment’ is a scientific problem. It is one that can be resolved 
in some cases. For example, the UK government  has been able to define 
sustainability standards for SO2 according to the effects of SO2 pollution upon 
ecosystems and human health (Ekins & Simon 2001: 7). The normative and political 
component is inevitably present in terms of whether the impairment is acceptable. 
Some sustainability limits might be difficult or impossible to identify, especially 
given that ecosystems can be subject to dynamic, non-linear change and are complex 
systems which react unpredictably to disturbances. Aggregating data to measure 
ecological change can also be problematic because of what Hayek refers to as the 
‘particular circumstances of time and place.’ But we do know that, in order to avoid a 
certain level of ecosystem impairment, a limit does exist for the causal variables 
involved. For example, in order to avoid a given increase in mean global temperature, 
scientists know that there is a certain level of greenhouse gas emissions that must not 
be exceeded over a certain time period. They may not have precise knowledge of this 
limit but they do know that it exists. 
 
The work of Hayek typifies the reluctance of the Austrian school to admit the need for 
and possibility of such centralised knowledge gathering in order to address externality 
problems. Hayek does acknowledge that “there are some facts concerning probable 
future developments which the government is more likely to know than most of the 
individual owners of natural resources” (Hayek 1960: 371). But nowhere does Hayek 
acknowledge the economic importance of such scientific information. Such physical 
data may be only ‘technical’ in the sense defined above but it still has an important 
role in economic analysis (O’Neill 2004: 444). Physical indicators are now used, for 
example, by the OECD to aid environmental decision making (Nyborg 2000: 394). 
These developments in the environmental field supplement the work of writers who 
offer other cases of economically relevant knowledge that is gathered through non-
market channels. Hilary Wainwright has highlighted the collective nature of the 
knowledge of workers, which is of a kind that is often overlooked by the marketviii. 
John O’Neill has pointed to the importance of non-market institutions such as 
scientific associations as a source of knowledgeix. Such non-market institutions share 
a connection with the problem of productive calculation. Yet the ecological aspect of 
economic calculation is of notable significance in being concerned with managing 
resource scarcity, the defining feature of any economic calculation problem. Not only 
does it demonstrate the potential of non-market channels for gathering knowledge 
about resource usage but also involves the technique of distilling this information in 
the form of indicators. This provides a certain degree of simplification of economic 
choices facing producers and policy makers whilst remaining faithful to the 
essentially incommensurable nature of different indicators of sustainability. They 
offer guidance on the ecological cost of productive practices and thus serve as a spur 
to innovation in those areas where improvements are most needed. Such indicators 
were developed after the work of Mises and Hayek who held that monetary prices 




9 Value complexity and democratising calculation 
 
In the free market, the ecological impact of economic activity is established by the 
individual decisions of the multiplicity of firms and consumers. In the green 
paradigm, environmental limits are established through a political decision. As Beck 
comments: “the intrusion of ecological concerns into the economy opens the economy 
to politics” (Beck 1997: 127). This shift results in complexity being displaced from 
the economic to the political sphere.  
 
The Austrians and greens are in agreement on the essentially normative, hence 
political, character of intervention in the market. Both recognise that decisions 
concerning the use of ecological services must consider a plurality of 
incommensurable values. Here, both Austrian and ecological economics contrast with 
the ‘orthodox,’ ‘neoclassical’ school of environmental economics which reduces the 
task of achieving sustainability to a purely technical one in which environmental 
values are assumed to be objectively measurable in monetary terms (Mulberg 1992: 
335-6). Mulberg’s suggestion that this is “a negation of the democratic political 
process” (ibid: 340) reflects the general view within the green paradigm about the 
orthodox approach.  
 
The green paradigm favours addressing the ethical character of such decisions within 
the political sphere (Dryzek 1997: 149; Barry 1999: 108). For Hayek, by contrast, an 
increase in the scope of political power means “everything tends to become a political 
issue for which the interference of the coercive powers of government can be 
invoked” (Hayek 1979: 138). The Austrian conclusion is that free markets should be 
left to operate mainly independently of politics to serve as a neutral means of 
facilitating individual autonomy. 
 
Where the Austrians differ from the greens is in holding that the normative 
contestability of economic choices is decisive as an argument against all but the most 
minimal forms of state intervention in the market. Here, the green paradigm offers 
some important responses to the Austrians. Firstly, as discussed above, some form of 
non-market decision making is required in order to establish a principle of 
sustainability. Free market environmentalists are concerned that this involves an 
excessive reliance upon “omniscient, benevolent experts” (Anderson & Leal 1991: 
169). But the challenge of defining the normative, contestable concept of 
sustainability arises in any form of economy, including contemporary society (Zolo 
1992: 63) and cannot be simply resolved by recourse to the market.  
 
For Zolo, a reduction in political complexity is needed and this can only be achieved 
by a concentration of power (Zolo 1992: 56) that is incompatible with both the liberal 
and more participatory brands of democracy. It is thus complexity itself and not the 
presence or absence of markets that, from his realist perspective, are the source of the 
challenge to democracy. The green paradigm opens up two routes for responding to 
the realist pessimism as well as to the Austrians. The first is to argue that it is possible 
to achieve a certain degree of public consensus on the need for environmental 
sustainability as a normative objective. Second is to design political institutions to 
accommodate divergent values. Of course, in practice, the two proposed approaches 
are often combined.  
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With regard to the first route, the green paradigm does not suggest that the challenge 
of democracy and complexity can be entirely removed by a normative consensus. This 
would be to neglect the contested nature of the concept of sustainability and the need 
for allocative decisions involving normative judgement even when a definition of 
sustainability has been agreed. However, it is recognised that a certain degree of 
consensus is required by the green paradigm, including a general acceptance of at 
least the weaker version of the sustainability principle. It is suggested by Barry, for 
example, that the “simplification” of economic life in the sustainable economy 
“would enhance the prospects for democratic decision-making and democratic norms 
throughout society as a whole” (Barry 1999: 211). Agreement upon ethical doctrines, 
in Zolo’s terms, reduces complexity. It enables decision options to be pre-selected, 
allowing for speedier, more coherent choices (Zolo 1992: 31). It would seem that even 
a certain degree of consensus can start to bring such benefits and it is in this sense that 
the green paradigm envisages as possible some simplification of the choices facing 
political institutions. This becomes more achievable as the scale of ecological 
problems becomes more widely recognised.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a strong recognition in the green paradigm that political 
institutions need to be designed to accommodate a diversity of values and 
perspectives and this is the second channel open to the greens in response to the 
Austrians. As Barry argues, the heterogeneous array of valuation criteria in a green 
economy can be opened up for public judgement within the political sphere instead of 
relying upon individuals’ decisions in the market to fully account for them:  
 
“Rather than seeking a single commensurable unit (money values) upon which to base 
environmental decision-making, we ought to search for a common framework within 
which all valuations can be articulated. That is to allow the plurality of environmental 
values to be articulated, and then assessing them via a public judgement of their 
normative underpinnings, perhaps through voting on them” (Barry 1999: 149). 
 
This is not to deny that market prices have a part to play in environmental decision-
making but rather to suggest that those values of society that cannot be captured by 
market exchange values sometimes require expression through a political process. A 
number of approaches to public planning and resource allocation incorporate 
participation and seek to facilitate this political articulation of values. Ecological 
issues have been an important spur to such developments that have been strongly 
supported within the green paradigm.  
 
There is of course no guarantee that increased participation will mean moves towards 
environmentally sustainable policy choices (Dryzek 1992: 38) but it does encourage 
mutual understanding, offering the prospect of reducing the intensity of disagreement.  
The Austrians do not consider the potential of such forms of democracy and instead 
propose a thin political sphere. Hayek captures this Austrian view when he describes 
democracy as “basically a negative value, a procedural rule which serves as a 
protection against despotism and tyranny” (Hayek 1979:133). 
 
As well as having to address value complexity, deliberative approaches are also faced 
with economic complexity in the enlarged political sphere of the green paradigm. The 
democratic precondition of balancing coordination with the utilisation of local 
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knowledge becomes a challenge for political institutions. This is the point developed 
by Mark Pennington in his Hayekian critique which questions “the assumption that a 
participatory/ deliberative democracy can deliver an appropriately ‘integrated’ and 
‘holistic’ set of environmental decisions” (Pennington 2001: 177). The implication is 
that the reduced role of markets would mean that the guidance function that they 
perform would be unfulfilled. Markets facilitate the establishment of the appropriate 
size of organisations (ibid: 176) and integration between different decision-making 
spaces and scales (ibid: 179). Although this argument casts aside the problem of 
monopolies and oligopolies that can arise in markets, there is certainly, at present, a 
need for further investigation into this question of how far deliberative institutions can 
replace this coordination function of the market. This is an important challenge for the 
green paradigm. 
 
Green thought thus makes an important contribution to the debate concerning the 
relationship between economic complexity and democracy by showing that a certain 
amount of economic complexity can be displaced to the political sphere. There is 
scope for exploring interesting, subsequent questions such as the degree of consensus 
required for the development of such democratic political institutions and the extent to 
which they can be a substitute for the market coordination function. Such questions 
are not even recognised by Mises and Hayek, whose discussion of democracy is 
confined to a conventional, representative model. Participatory, non-market 
institutions are viewed only as exacerbating, rather than addressing, the problem of 
complexity. This leaves untouched a potentially significant counter-argument to the 
Austrian scepticism about enlarging the political sphere. 
 
 
10 Incentives problem 
 
The prior discussion shows that the implications of sustainability and the capacity of 
non-market institutions all cast the problem of economic complexity in a new light. 
These features of the green paradigm are a source for a potential response to the 
Austrians. Yet there is a further important aspect of this theme of democracy, 
complexity and markets that tends to be overlooked by both the Austrians and the 
advocates of a halfway house model. This is a point made by Marxists concerning the 
market itself being a potential source of complexity. It is pointed out that markets 
create incentives that can undermine the implementation of democratic objectives. 
There is a ceaseless pressure upon firms to make a profit and achieve the capital 
accumulation that is required to ensure their survival (Ollman 1998: 151). Such an 
incentive can conflict with environmental policies of regulation and intervention that 
aim to pass on environmental costs to producers. This conflict of incentives has been 
evident in the difficulties involved in defining and implementing the Kyoto treaty on 
climate change for example, where the vested interests of certain industries have 
prevented anything other than very slow progress. In such cases, incentives from the 
economic market can affect political outcomes through a process of lobbying 
politicians, corruption or even migration of capital. There is thus a built in tendency 
for a halfway house model to go back towards a free market capitalist one (Arnold 
1987). It can therefore be viewed as an inherently unstable means of attaining certain 






The Austrians’ work provides a useful insight into the problem of complexity that 
must be faced by models of political economy such as the green paradigm. The greens 
make an important response by moving away from the consumer sovereignty 
principle and towards the normative objectives of sustainability and democratic co-
operation. Furthermore, developments in ecological theory give cause for questioning 
Hayekian scepticism about the knowledge gathering capability of non-market 
institutions. Such arguments might even be used for extending the scope of non-
market institutions beyond that envisaged by the halfway house, as was proposed by 
some of the socialists towards whom Mises’ argument was initially directed. This is a 
route that should perhaps not be ruled out. While such a position must still face the 
problems of value and economic complexity, it holds the prospect of avoiding the 
problems associated with market incentives that a halfway house model must address.  
 
Whatever model is to be the preferred alternative, it is clear that the green paradigm 
offers the potential for common ground with different elements within the socialist 
tradition. For example, the development of participatory political theory represents an 
“important convergence between the left and the Greens” (Mulberg 1992: 340). The 
calculation debate thus becomes broadened to incorporate the political as well as the 
economic sphere. Such common ground can provide an important part of the response 
to the Austrians, whose pro-market case is widely assumed to be an irresistible one, 
even if their narrow conception of the political actor is not. Yet such developments 
require closer engagement with the Austrian arguments. Rather than viewing their 
argument as one that can be avoided on the grounds that it is based upon questionable 
philosophical premises, it would be better to treat it as a spur to further research 
concerning the potential capabilities of democratic, non-market institutions in the face 
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i See, for example, Mises’ 1920, an important, early contribution to the debate. 
ii Points i and ii are also referred to by Zolo (1992: 126) and point iii is included in his definition of 
complexity (Zolo 1992: 3). 
iii  See, for example, Barry (1999: 146). 
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iv Greens could argue that the tax and subsidy policies used in actually existing ‘free market’ 
economies, for example state subsidies of the nuclear industry, already influence environmental 
outcomes and so in this sense elements of the halfway house already exist. 
v Hayek makes this point (Hayek 1960: 368). 
vi  In 2005 the charge was increased to £8. 
vii  This is made clear in the work of Ekins & Simon (2003). 
viii  See Wainwright 1994, especially chapter 6. 
ix  O’Neill 1998, chapter 11. 
 
